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A B S T R A C T 
We study the relation between the chair of the board of directors and the CEO. We argue that 
substantial age dissimilarity between the two  giving rise to cognitive conflict  increases 
board monitoring and firm value for firms with greater monitoring needs. We find evidence 
for our hypothesis using data on German two-tier boards. German law mitigates endogeneity 
concerns as it prevents CEO duality and also restricts CEO power in other ways. Additional 
identification attempts include CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects, random effects, 
dynamic panel data estimations, and the use of the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous 
shock to monitoring needs. We find that during the crisis, when fast decision making and 
managerial discretion were needed, the link between age dissimilarity and firm value 
changed.  
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1. Introduction  
To date, very little is known about the impact on corporate governance of the chair’s 
characteristics and the interaction between non-executive and executive directors via the 
chair and CEO. Yet, there is a great need for a sound understanding of the chair’s impact on 
governance and the form of the optimal chair-CEO relation. This need arises not only 
because many countries have a two-tier board system under which the roles of the chair and 
CEO are separated, but also because an increasing fraction of firms operating under the 
single-tier board system are abandoning CEO duality.1 We address this gap in the literature 
by studying the relationship between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO under 
the German two-tier board system.  
Under the German system, the chair plays a key role as he or she presides over the 
supervisory board, schedules its meetings, sets the meeting agendas, distributes material in 
advance of meetings, leads the board’s discussions, and is expected to be kept informed by 
the CEO about any relevant firm issues (see the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), 
paragraphs 95-116, and the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), section 5.2). 
According to German Co-determination law (paragraph 29(2), MitbestG), which applies to 
firms with at least 2,000 employees, the chair is also the only member of the supervisory 
board who has two voting rights in case of a voting tie.  
We suggest that the relation between the chair and the CEO is shaped by the age 
similarity between the two. Age affects an individual’s attitude, behavior, and thinking, (see, 
e.g., Rhodes, 1983; Serfling, 2014; Taylor, 1975). Hence, directors of a similar age are likely 
to hold similar attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Wagner et al., 1984; Westphal and Zajac, 
                                                          
1
 The 2014 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index reports that 47% of S&P 500 companies split the role of the CEO 
and the chair, and another 24% have planned a split of these two roles over the following five years. For the 
U.K., Renneboog and Zhao (2011) report a separate CEO and chair for 87% of their observations between 1996 
and 2007. 
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1995a) as they have witnessed the same historical events and social trends. In other words, 
directors of a similar age are likely to be mentally connected and similarly minded. 
We therefore hypothesize that increasing age dissimilarity between the chair and the 
CEO reduces mutual attraction between the two and thereby fosters the chair’s cognitive 
independence and gives rise to cognitive conflict (Amason, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
McPherson et al., 2001). This leads to more intensive monitoring in the form of more 
scrutinizing and critical judgment of the CEO’s decisions and proposed actions. In addition, 
more scrutinizing forces the CEO to provide more information to convince the chair and the 
board of her plans, which makes the chair and the board better informed and hence even 
better able to monitor the CEO more intensively (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The positive 
relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and monitoring intensity is expected to increase 
firm value. As age-induced dissimilarities between individuals are most evident across 
different generations (e.g., Pilcher, 1994), we argue that a generational difference, i.e., a 
generational age gap, between the chair and the CEO has the strongest impact on monitoring 
intensity and ultimately firm value. 
We find strong empirical support for our hypothesis about the effects of chair-CEO 
age dissimilarity on monitoring intensity and firm value. Our two key results are as follows. 
First, we find a significantly positive effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity on firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, particularly when there is a generational age gap. Second, we find 
that substantial age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO increases the number of 
board meetings, which likely proxies for the level of monitoring (see Adams, 2005; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010).2 In line with Adams and Ferreira (2007) who argue that the optimal 
level of board monitoring varies across firms, we only observe the aforementioned positive 
                                                          
2
 Under the German two-tier governance system, board meetings are particularly likely to reflect (board) 
monitoring intensity because the supervisory board’s main responsibility is to monitor management on behalf of 
the shareholders as prescribed by German law (see paragraph 111(1), AktG, and, e.g., Andres et al., 2014).  
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effects of the number of board meetings on firm value for firms with greater monitoring 
needs (i.e., those with high free cash flows, dispersed control, and low intangibles). 
Importantly, all of our regressions control for other dissimilarities between the chair 
and the CEO, including differences in education, gender and nationality. They also control 
for similarities such as those stemming from the time the two have been working together and 
family relations. They also adjust, among others, for the chair’s and the CEO’s experience 
and power as measured by, e.g., their tenure and whether they have founded the firm.  
As we use data on German two-tier boards, our results are also less likely to suffer 
from endogeneity caused by CEO power. Importantly, they do not suffer from endogeneity 
caused by CEO duality. This is the case as, according to German law (paragraph 105, AktG), 
the duties of the management board (“Vorstand”) are clearly delineated from decision control 
and monitoring as well as nominating activities that are performed by the supervisory board 
(“Aufsichtsrat”). The supervisory board’s independence is further strengthened as German 
law prohibits membership by the same individual of both boards, thereby enforcing a strict 
separation of the roles of the chair and the CEO. Importantly, the CEO is not allowed to be 
involved with the nomination and appointment of members of the supervisory board.3 In 
contrast, evidence for the U.S. one-tier system suggests that CEOs typically influence the 
composition of the board of directors (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), leading to increased demographic similarity 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995a).  
Although the use of German data mitigates endogeneity caused by CEO power and 
prevents endogeneity caused by CEO duality, we nevertheless use CEO-firm as well as chair-
                                                          
3
 Paragraph 124(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) prohibits executives from nominating 
members of the supervisory board. The firm’s nomination committee nominates candidates for the supervisory 
board as well as candidates for the CEO position. Importantly, the CEO cannot be a member of this committee.  
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firm fixed effects and dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions to 
address potential endogeneity. Furthermore, we use the return on assets (ROA), a measure of 
firm performance, as an alternative to firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. All of these 
robustness tests confirm our results. Further, our hypothesis is confirmed when age 
dissimilarity is measured more broadly, i.e., when we consider age dissimilarity between the 
chair and the entire management board or between the CEO and the entire supervisory board. 
Our most important endogeneity test consists of treating the 2007 financial crisis as an 
exogenous shock, altering the optimal levels of monitoring. The results indicate that chair-
CEO age dissimilarity has a causal relation, as hypothesized, with monitoring intensity and 
firm value. Specifically, we find that firms with substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity hold 
significantly fewer board meetings, i.e., they reduce their monitoring levels during the crisis. 
We further find that during the crisis substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity destroys firm 
value, consistent with the increased need for managerial discretion and fast decision making 
(see, e.g., De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015; Faleye et al., 2011; Li et al., 2014). Importantly, the 
negative effect on firm value during the crisis almost cancels out the positive effect observed 
during the non-crisis years. We hence conclude that firms should mind the gap. 
Importantly, our dataset benefits from sufficient time-series variation, necessary for 
parameter identification. In particular, for 14% (15%) of all observations there is a CEO 
(chair) change. During the financial crisis, a change of either the CEO or the chair (or both) 
occurs in 29% of the firm-year observations. This percentage varies between 22% and 25% 
for the sub-samples of firms with high and those with low monitoring needs. Further, the use 
of random effects as an alternative to firm-fixed effects, as one way to address potentially low 
time-series variation (see, e.g., Andres, 2008), confirms our results. 
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Our study makes a major contribution to the as yet very limited literature about the 
effects of the chair’s characteristics on firm value. To the best of our knowledge, the only 
other study that explicitly examines the role of the chair is Waelchli and Zeller (2013). They 
use survey data on unlisted Swiss firms and report that chair age is negatively related to firm 
performance. They argue that this reduction in performance is caused by a drop in the chair’s 
cognitive abilities and motivation. However, they do not find such a relation for their control 
sample of listed firms. Likewise, we do not find an impact of chair age on firm value and on 
the number of board meetings for our sample of listed German firms.  
We also contribute to the emerging literature on the effects of (dis)similarities 
between the CEO and the board of directors. For the U.S., Fracassi and Tate (2012), Hwang 
and Kim (2009), and Lee et al. (2014) provide evidence that social ties between the CEO and 
the other directors reduce firm value as they weaken the intensity of monitoring by the board. 
Ngyuen (2012) finds similar results for large French firms. While the aforementioned studies 
focus on the entire board as well as similarity stemming from social ties, our study is 
concerned with demographic similarity and focuses on the important relation between the 
chair and the CEO.  
Our study has policy implications for regulation pertaining to the composition of the 
board of directors, with particular reference to the age of the chair. Indeed, our results on the 
effect of age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO on monitoring intensity and firm value 
suggest that in terms of corporate governance one size does not fit all. These findings are in 
direct contrast with recommendations from corporate governance codes to limit the age of 
corporate board members.  
Our results are not only relevant to the two-tier governance system, but also to an 
already large and still increasing fraction of firms operating under the single-tier board 
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system, which have moved towards the separation of the roles of the chair and the CEO. 
Hence, there is an increasing need to understand the relation between the chair and the CEO. 
We provide evidence that demographic characteristics, age in particular, significantly shape 
this relation and, importantly, that this relation matters for firm value.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
existing literature and derives our main hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
presents our data. Section 4 provides the results of the regressions on firm value. Section 5 
addresses the following two important questions. First, does substantial age dissimilarity 
between the chair and CEO indeed result in more monitoring? Second, is the positive effect 
of chair-CEO age dissimilarity on monitoring and firm value limited to firms with greater 
monitoring needs? Section 6 tests the robustness of our results. Conclusions follow. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Age and age similarity 
Demographic attributes  including age, educational level, ethnicity and gender  
affect individual behavior, decision-making, thinking, etc. (Pfeffer, 1983). Among these 
demographic attributes, age and gender are the most clearly discernible ones. Contrary to 
gender and most other demographic attributes, age is a multifarious and dynamic collection 
of personal characteristics which encompass the experiences that have been made during an 
individual’s life. As such, aging constitutes a diverse set of factors that progressively shape 
the personality of a human being (Medawar, 1952), thereby continuously affecting behavior, 
communication, (strategic) decision making, information processing and usage, risk-taking, 
thinking and commitment to work (e.g., Child, 1974; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Rhodes, 
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1983; Serfling, 2014; Taylor, 1975; Verhaeghen and Salthouse, 1997; Vroom and Pahl, 1971; 
Zenger and Lawrence, 1989).4 
Further, Stangor et al. (1992) find that age per se constitutes a salient basis for group 
categorization, independent of whether there are underlying attitudinal or behavioral 
differences. In this regard, Ferris et al. (1991) argue that “age plays a major role in 
establishing the social context in which organizational members interact” (p. 617). Wagner et 
al. (1984) extend this to members of boards of directors. Directors of a similar age are likely 
to share experiences, and are hence likely to hold similar attitudes, opinions and beliefs. 
Moreover, as they have witnessed the same historical events and social trends, which have 
shaped their life experiences and moral values, directors and managers of a similar age are 
likely to be mentally connected and similarly minded. 
2.2 Similarities among directors and corporate governance 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that, to ensure its effectiveness, the board should be 
cognitively independent and critically minded such that different points of views are able to 
emerge and the decisions proposed by the executives are scrutinized sufficiently. However, 
this is unlikely to be the case if board members  particularly the chair and the CEO  are 
demographically similar, such as of similar age. 
This can be explained by the “similar attraction” phenomenon or homophily (e.g., 
Byrne, 1971; Byrne and Griffitt, 1973; see also McPherson et al., 2001). Human beings 
prefer to interact and communicate with individuals that are similar to them. The reason is 
that similarity ensures more affirmative feedback while limiting disagreement as well as the 
                                                          
4
 For example, older directors and executives have been found to use more information in their decision making 
process and to provide a more accurate assessment of that information (Taylor, 1975). They are also associated 
with less risk-taking behavior, while younger directors and executives tend to take more and partly excessive 
risks (see, e.g., Serfling, 2014; Vroom and Pahl, 1971).  
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emergence of alternative opinions. As a consequence, (demographic or social) similarity 
between the CEO and board members can lead to less effective corporate governance. 
In support of this argument, Fracassi and Tate (2012), Hwang and Kim (2009), and 
Lee et al. (2014) find that U.S. boards where the CEO has social ties with the other directors 
– in the form of shared networks, similar regional or educational background or similar 
political orientation – are associated with weaker corporate governance and reduced firm 
value. Ngyuen (2012) finds comparable results for large French firms. Furthermore, Westphal 
and Zajac (1995a) find that CEOs who are able to influence the nomination process tend to 
appoint directors with similar demographic characteristics.5 They find that demographic 
similarity is associated with increased CEO compensation. Westphal and Zajac (1995b) find 
that, when the board is demographically similar to the CEO, it is more likely to use human-
resource based explanations (i.e., attracting and retaining managerial talent) rather than 
agency based explanations (i.e., alignment of interest) to justify the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans for the CEO. 
2.3 Age dissimilarity, monitoring intensity and firm value 
We hypothesize that substantial age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO 
increases board monitoring effectiveness, and ultimately firm value. Specifically, we argue 
that greater age dissimilarity increases cognitive independence of the chair and gives rise to 
cognitive conflicts between the chair and the CEO. This should lead to more scrutinizing and 
critical judgment of the actions and decisions proposed by the latter, forcing the CEO to 
provide more information to convince the chair and the board of her plans. Put differently, 
                                                          
5
 In a related study concerned with executive careers in German banks, Berger et al. (2013) find that homophily, 
based on age and gender as well as social ties, increases the chances of an outsider appointment to banks’ 
management boards.   
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the CEO is forced to increase transparency by providing more detailed and value-relevant 
information regarding her proposed actions (Amason, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 6  
We expect a certain level of age dissimilarity between individuals to be necessary for 
cognitive conflict to arise. In other words, we expect the relation between age dissimilarity on 
the one side and monitoring intensity and firm value on the other side to be strongest for large 
chair-CEO age differences. Particularly, as age-induced dissimilarities between individuals 
(such as the chair and the CEO) are most evident across different generations (e.g., Pilcher, 
1994), we argue that a generational difference, i.e., a generational age gap, between the chair 
and the CEO has the strongest impact on monitoring intensity and firm value.  
3. Methodology, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Methodology and measures for the chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
Our main model is as follows: 
yit   =   α  + β1* Gap20 chair-CEOit + β2* other chair-CEO dissimilaritiesit  
               + β3* CEO characteristicsit + β4* chair characteristicsit  
               + β5* supervisory board characteristicsit + β6* firm characteristicsit  
               + year dummies + μi + εit                          
(1) 
As dependent variables, we use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value and the number of 
supervisory board meetings (Board meetings) to measure monitoring intensity. 
Gap20 chair-CEO is our primary measure for the chair-CEO age dissimilarity. This 
dummy variable is set to one if the age difference between the chair and the CEO is a 
                                                          
6
 Consistent with the importance of cognitive conflict and critical questions, the 2012 U.S. Business 
Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance state: “Board independence depends not only on directors’ 
individual relationships and outlook but also on their ability to question management, exercise constructive 
skepticism and express their views even when those views may differ from those of management or other 
directors” (p. 14). 
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generational gap. In line with the sociology literature (e.g., Strauss and Howe, 1997), we 
define a generational age gap as an age difference of at least 20 years. Again, the rationale for 
using a generational age gap is that cognitive conflict between the chair and the CEO should 
be strongest if both are from different generations.  
In addition, we also use Chair-CEO age difference (+/-), which is the age of the chair 
minus the age of the CEO, and its square, i.e., Squared chair-CEO age difference. In this 
regard, it is important to note that cognitive conflict, but also communication problems, 
between the chair and the CEO may not only arise if the former is considerably older than the 
latter, but also if the former is younger than the latter. If the relation between age difference 
and firm value is non-linear, as suggested, and if the sign of the age difference does not 
matter, only the squared term of this functional form (i.e., the second-order polynomial) is 
expected to be significant. Alternatively, we use Chair-CEO age difference absolute, which 
is the absolute value of the age difference between the chair and the CEO. This alternative 
measure is used in conjunction with Chair younger, a dummy variable, which is set to one if 
the chair is younger than the CEO, and zero otherwise. Based on the above argument, we do 
not expect this dummy variable to be significantly different from zero. Finally, whenever we 
use Chair-CEO age difference absolute, we use the natural logarithm of the dependent 
variable given that we postulate a non-equidistant (i.e., a non-uniform) effect of each year of 
age difference. 
All of the regressions include the following five sets of control variables. All these 
variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. The first set includes chair-CEO dissimilarities 
other than age, i.e., education, gender and nationality, as well as chair-CEO similarities, i.e., 
the number of years the chair and CEO have been working together in their respective 
positions (Chair-CEO joint tenure) and a dummy variable equaling one if the chair and CEO 
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are from the same family (Chair-CEO same family). All of these variables may affect 
cognitive dissonance and communication between the chair and the CEO, in addition to age 
dissimilarity.  
The following four sets of control variables include CEO characteristics, chair 
characteristics, supervisory board characteristics and firm characteristics. CEO characteristics 
include the variables CEO tenure, i.e., the number of years the CEO has been serving as the 
firm’s CEO, and Founder CEO, a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO founded the firm. 
These two variables serve as proxies for the CEO’s experience and power (see, e.g., Adams 
et al., 2005). Chair characteristics include Busy chair, a dummy variable set to one if the chair 
holds three or more directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), Chair tenure and Founder 
chair (both defined as above for CEOs) and a dummy variable Chair is former firm executive, 
which is set to one if the chair was an executive of the firm earlier in her career (in the spirit 
of Fahlenbrach et al., 2011, and Andres et al., 2014). The last three variables attempt to 
capture the chair’s experience and power. 
The two dummy variables CEO change and Chair change, which are set to one for 
years with a CEO and chair change, respectively, are also included in this set of controls. As 
the chair-CEO age difference may change due to chair and CEO changes, which are likely to 
correlate with the firm’s performance and number of board meetings, these two controls are 
necessary to separate the (persistent) effect of the variables measuring the chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity from the (one-off) effects of changes at the top of the firm.  
Supervisory board characteristics include Board age, which is the average age of the 
shareholder representatives on the supervisory board, Busy board (as defined in Fich and 
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Shivdasani, 2006,) and CV board age.7 The latter is the coefficient of variation calculated as 
the standard deviation of the age of shareholder representatives on the supervisory board 
divided by Board age. CV board age controls for age diversity on the supervisory board, 
which might correlate with the age of the chair and thus with our measures of chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity. 
Firm characteristics include Book leverage (i.e., total debt over total assets), the 
number of a firm’s business segments generating at least 10% of the firm’s total revenues 
(Business segments), capital expenditures as a fraction of total assets (CapEx/TA), a dummy 
variable Family firm (we use the definition from Andres, 2008), Firm age (since foundation), 
Free float (of the firm’s voting shares), R&D expenses as a fraction of total revenues 
(R&D/Sales), return on equity (ROE), Sales growth (i.e., the nominal growth rate over the 
past two years), Stock volatility (i.e., the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
past two years) and Total assets as used in the existing literature (e.g., Andres, 2008; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, Custódio and Metzger, 2014).  
Some of the regressions in Table 2 and Table 3 examine the effects of chair and CEO 
age (Chair age and CEO age) on firm value and monitoring intensity, with and without chair 
and CEO age and our main variable Gap20 chair-CEO. This allows us to investigate whether 
age itself matters and whether our results for age dissimilarity are only reflecting age effects. 
The main estimation technique we use is firm-fixed effects regressions. As robustness 
checks (see Section 6.2), we use CEO-firm fixed effects and chair-firm fixed effects as well 
                                                          
7
 As information about the age of the employee representatives on the supervisory board is not available, we 
have to limit age-related variables for the supervisory board to the shareholder representatives. 
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as random effects.8 All the regressions are based on an unbalanced panel of data covering the 
years 2005 to 2010. We describe this panel in the following sub-sections. 
3.2 Sample selection 
We start by gathering information on all firms that are members of the three largest 
German stock exchange indices  the DAX, MDAX and SDAX  for each year during 2005 
and 2010.9 This results in an unbalanced panel of 780 firm-year observations for 172 firms. 
We exclude 31 firm-year observations for 7 firms that are not incorporated under German law 
(e.g., Air Berlin plc and EADS N.V.). For the remaining 165 firms we collect information for 
the CEO and each shareholder representative on the supervisory board. Following Westphal 
and Zajac (1995a), we exclude firm-year observations for which the age of more than 25% of 
the supervisory board members is not available. This leads to the exclusion of 36 firm-year 
observations. Finally, we exclude another 10 firm-year observations due to missing data. This 
leaves us with a final unbalanced panel comprising 700 firm-year observations for 150 firms, 
covering approximately 86% of the market capitalization of all German firms at the end of 
2006.  
Most of the non-financial information is collected from the annual reports, company 
filings (e.g., security prospectuses or governance reports) and company websites, 
Hoppenstedt Aktienführer, Munzinger Biographien, and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
database. Any remaining gaps in the data (particularly age) are filled by contacting the 
                                                          
8
 Due to changes in CEOs and chairs during the sample period, we have more CEOs (234 distinct CEOs) and 
more chairs (214 distinct chairs) than sample firms (150 distinct firms).  
9
 We include firms from regulated industries (i.e., SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Our results do not 
change when we exclude these firms (see Section 6.3).  
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investor relations departments of the firms concerned.10 Accounting data is retrieved from 
S&P Capital IQ. Data on stock prices is from Datastream.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our dataset. Panel A focuses on the age 
characteristics of the chair and the CEO, the other chair-CEO dissimilarities as well as the 
CEO characteristics and chair characteristics. The age gap between the chair and the CEO is 
at least 20 years for 15.2% of all observations. Importantly, for all such cases the chair is 
older than the CEO. The average CEO age is 54 years, while the average chair age is 63 
years. On average, the absolute age difference between the chair and the CEO is 11.3 years. 
The chair is younger than the CEO for 13% of all observations.11  
In terms of other chair-CEO dissimilarities, the chair and CEO have a different 
educational background for 58% of the observations and are of different genders for only two 
observations as virtually all chairs and CEOs are male. Further, the chair and CEO are of a 
different nationality for 16.7% of all observations. The average length of the (firm-specific) 
relation between the chair and the CEO (Chair-CEO joint tenure) is almost 4 years. Finally, 
the chair and CEO are from the same family for 2% of all observations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Moving on to the CEO and chair characteristics, average CEO tenure is about 6 years. 
The percentage of founder CEOs is 5%, and this is in line with Andres (2008). Turning to the 
chair characteristics, for 76% of all observations the chair is busy. Average chair tenure is 5 
                                                          
10
 Despite our best efforts, we are not able to gather data on all of the variables for all of the sample firms. In 
particular, we are not able to obtain information about the chair’s age for three firms. We are also not able to 
obtain full information about board meetings for two firm-year observations and information about active board 
committees for four firm-year observations.  
11
 For chairs that are younger than the CEO, the mean age difference is 6 years with a maximum of 18 years (not 
tabulated). Appendix B shows the distribution of the age difference between the CEO and the chair. 
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years. The chair is the firm’s founder for 5.1% and a former firm executive for 29% of all 
observations, respectively. There are no cases of deaths of CEOs or chairs in our sample.  
Turning to supervisory board characteristics in Panel B, average board size is about 
12, with approximately 7 shareholder representatives. Note that, in Germany, board size 
depends on firm size as prescribed by law (see paragraph 95, AktG). Average board tenure 
(traced back to 1998) is about 5 years. Average board age (based on shareholder 
representatives) is about 60 years. The average annual number of board meetings is about 6. 
Sample firms typically have about 3 active board committees. All supervisory board (and 
chair) characteristics have values in line with those reported by the Spencer Stuart Board 
Index for 2007 and 2009.  
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics. On average, book 
leverage is 25%, the number of business segments is 2.27, capital expenditures amount to 4% 
of total assets, firm age (since foundation) is 87 years, R&D expenditures are 1.3% of sales, 
return on equity is 10%, and Tobin’s Q is 1.46. The average (median) book value of total 
assets is 49,263 (2,575) million EUR. Regarding control and ownership, average free float is 
approximately 48%. About one third of all firm-year observations relate to family firms.12 
These descriptive statistics are similar to those from other studies on Germany, such as 
Andres (2008), Bermig and Frick (2010), and Dittmann et al. (2010). 
Finally, Panel D contains descriptive statistics for the management board 
characteristics. The management board is younger on average, smaller in size and has lower 
tenure as compared to the supervisory board (see Panel B). 
                                                          
12
 Compared to Andres (2008), we find a lower percentage of family firms. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, Andres (2008) does not restrict his sample to the largest stock listed firms (DAX, MDAX and SDAX) 
as he uses all firms listed on the Official Market (“Amtlicher Handel”) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange at 
December 31, 1998. It is then not surprising that we find a lower fraction of family firms given our focus on the 
largest German firms. Second, Andres (2008) excludes banks and insurance companies which are less likely to 
be family firms. 
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4. Chair-CEO Age Dissimilarity and Firm Value  
We now turn to the regression results for the link between chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity and firm value (i.e., Tobin’s Q) shown in Table 2. All regressions adjust for 
firm-fixed and year-fixed effects and include the sets of control variables introduced in 
Section 3.1. The regressions vary in terms of the measure of chair-CEO age dissimilarity. 
When we use Chair-CEO age difference absolute, we use the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q 
as the dependent variable, as motivated in Section 3.1.13  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Regression (1) does not include any measure of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, but 
includes CEO age and chair age. Neither of these two variables is significant at any of the 
conventional levels.14 In contrast, any of the four measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
(see regressions (2) to (6)) is significant at the 5% level or better. In detail, our main measure 
of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, i.e., Gap20 chair-CEO, is significant at the 1% level in all 
regressions that include this variable (regressions (2), (3), and (5)), independent of whether 
we control for the age of the chair and the CEO (regression (3)) or whether we use the natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q (ln(Tobin’s Q)) as the dependent variable (in regression (5)).  
Regressions (4) and (6) include the signed age difference as well as its square and the 
absolute age difference, respectively, as alternative measures of age dissimilarity. In 
regression (4), the square of the signed age difference is significant (at the 1% level), while 
the simple chair-CEO age difference is not significant, as expected. This further supports our 
reasoning that only the large age differences rather than all age differences create value and 
                                                          
13
 Using the logarithmic form, we also account for potential outliers and allow the reader to interpret the 
findings as semi-elasticities. 
14
 This finding is in line with the recent literature. For example, Custódio and Metzger (2014) report that CEO 
age is not associated with firm value in the U.S. Waelchli and Zeller (2013) find that chair age is not associated 
with lower firm performance in publicly listed Swiss firms. See also the introduction to the present paper. 
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that the sign of the age difference does not matter. Regression (6) confirms this conclusion. 
The regression coefficient on Chair-CEO age difference absolute is positive and significant 
at the 5% level. In contrast, the Chair younger dummy variable is not significant. This 
confirms our argument that what matters is age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO 
and not whether the former is older than the latter (or vice-versa). When we interact the 
variable Chair-CEO age difference absolute with the dummy variable Chair younger in 
unreported regressions, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, 
while the coefficient on Chair-CEO age difference absolute remains significant. This 
constitutes another test, in addition to the use of the second-order polynomial of the signed 
age difference between the chair and the CEO, of the validity of our argument that the age 
difference between the chair and the CEO, but not the sign of this difference, matters. 
Regression (7) of Table 2 controls for additional important characteristics of the 
management board, which capture age variation and experience and are thus likely to 
correlate with chair-CEO age dissimilarity. These characteristics are the size of the 
management board, the average age and tenure of its members, and the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of the ages of its members. These variables, except for management board 
size, are calculated excluding the CEO (for whose characteristics we control separately). The 
results remain qualitatively similar when we add the above controls. 
To sum up, there is consistent evidence across all seven regressions that chair-CEO 
age dissimilarity is associated with significantly higher firm value. Importantly and in line 
with our main hypothesis, differences in firm value are associated with differences in age 
between the chair and CEO, and not with their age levels. Finally, it is the greater age 
differences  such as a generational age gap  and not age differences of any size that are 
associated with higher firm value. 
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As to the different sets of control variables, the regression results confirm the results 
from previous studies. More specifically, we find that founder CEOs and founder chairs (to a 
lesser extent) are associated with higher firm value, confirming the results of Andres (2008). 
Yet, we do not find that the chair and CEO being from the same family has any consistent 
effect on firm value. We shall return to this result below, when reviewing the regressions on 
the number of board meetings. As expected, free float and a change in the CEO are associated 
with lower firm value. Finally and in line with existing research, we find that firm size, 
leverage and the number of business segments are associated with lower firm value (see, e.g., 
Andres, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Dittmann et al., 2010).  
5. Chair-CEO Age Dissimilarity, Monitoring Intensity and the Need for Monitoring  
We now focus on the following two questions that arise from our previous analysis. 
First, is the positive relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value indeed a 
reflection of greater monitoring? Second, is the positive relation between chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity and firm value mainly observed for firms requiring greater monitoring? If the 
answer to both of these questions is affirmative, this will provide further support for our main 
hypothesis.  
5.1 Does greater age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO result in more monitoring? 
In order to answer this question, we check whether greater age dissimilarity between 
the chair and CEO results in more board meetings. The number of board meetings is an 
appropriate metric for the amount of board monitoring as argued, for example, by Adams 
(2005) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010). In support of this argument, Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) document that board meetings devote most of their time to monitoring 
management. It is important to note that, in what follows, board meetings refer to supervisory 
board meetings. 
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The monitoring focus of board meetings is particularly emphasized under the German 
two-tier board system, where the supervisory board’s main responsibility is to monitor the 
firm’s management board on behalf of the shareholders, as prescribed by paragraph 111(1), 
AktG (see also Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The monitoring responsibilities of the German 
supervisory board are similar to those of the U.S. board of directors (see paragraphs 84, 87 
and 111, AktG). However, according to section 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, board meetings should (and predominantly do) take place without any member of the 
management board (including the CEO). This is in contrast to the U.S. corporate governance 
system where SOX mandates only one board meeting without the executive directors per year 
(see Larcker and Tayan, 2013).  
The results from the regression analysis are shown in Table 3. We run two types of 
regressions, both include firm-fixed and year-fixed effects. The first type (regressions (1) to 
(4)) is fixed-effects Poisson count regressions with the number of board meetings as the 
dependent variable. The second type (regressions (5) and (6)) is fixed-effects OLS 
regressions with the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings (i.e., ln(Board 
meetings)) as the dependent variable.  
We use the same sets of control variables as for the regressions on Tobin’s Q in Table 
2 and include the following four additional controls. First, we include the number of active 
board committees (No. of active committees) as in Vafeas (1999) to explain board meetings. 
Ex ante it is not clear how the number of active committees affects board meetings. On the 
one side, a greater number of active committees will take away some of the business from the 
board, hence reducing the need for board meetings. On the other side, a greater number of 
active committees may be a reflection of the greater complexity of the organization, and 
hence may be positively correlated with the number of board meetings. Second, we add 
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average tenure of the supervisory board members (Avg. tenure SB members). Board members 
who have longer (joint) tenure are likely to require fewer board meetings. There are at least 
two reasons for this: experience, and hence more efficient decision making, as well as 
“groupthink”, the latter referring to avoidance of conflict by actively foregoing critical 
questions (Coles et al., 2014; Janis, 1972). Third, we include the fraction of union 
representatives among the employee representatives (Union representatives). This fraction is 
likely to increase the number of board meetings as union representatives pursue employee 
interests but tend to have less firm-specific, operational knowledge as they do not work for 
the firm (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). Finally, we also include the Tobin’s Q from the 
previous year to account for past performance as firms with weak performance are likely to 
hold more board meetings. The regression results shown in Table 3 do not change 
qualitatively when we exclude these four additional controls. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We find no evidence in regressions (1) and (3) that CEO age and chair age per se 
affect board meeting frequency. However, we find that Gap20 chair-CEO has a significant 
(at the 5% level) and positive impact on the number of board meetings. This is the case for all 
three regressions, which contain this dummy variable, i.e., regressions (2), (3) and (5). We 
further find that the squared chair-CEO age difference (see regression (4)) and the absolute 
chair-CEO age difference (see regression (6)) have a significant (at the 5% level) and positive 
effect on the number of board meetings. Finally, we obtain similar results when we include 
the additional controls for management board characteristics (see regression (7)). 
We now turn to the control variables. In line with our argument that more board 
meetings mean more intensive monitoring, we find that firms with a founder CEO as well as 
those with their CEO being related to the chair hold fewer board meetings. This suggests that 
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a chair who is related to the CEO is less likely to monitor the latter. In contrast, a change in 
the CEO increases the number of board meetings. As per our expectations, we also find that 
supervisory boards with greater average tenure meet less frequently, whereas boards with 
more union representatives as well as more active committees meet more frequently. Finally 
and similar to Adams (2005), more complex organizations, as reflected by greater firm size, 
and more business segments hold more board meetings. We also find a positive effect of 
stock volatility on the number of board meetings.  
To sum up, we find strong evidence that age dissimilarity between the chair and the 
CEO is associated with significantly more intensive board monitoring. This is consistent with 
our general argument and the results for firm value shown in Section 4. The results also 
suggest that what matters is the age difference between the chair and the CEO, and not the 
actual chair and CEO ages. Similar to the regressions on firm value, we find that only the 
large age differences matter in terms of the number of board meetings.  
5.2 The need for monitoring 
While our results so far suggest that greater monitoring creates value, Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) predict that too much monitoring may destroy firm value. They argue that 
less monitoring, or more “friendly boards”, may be optimal for firms whose CEO needs 
advice rather than monitoring. In turn, this suggests that greater age dissimilarity between the 
chair and CEO only creates value in firms with relatively high monitoring needs. We 
investigate the validity of this conjecture by conducting a sub-sample analysis where we 
attempt to distinguish between firms with relatively high and firms with relatively low 
monitoring needs. We expect that firms with greater free cash flows relative to their sales 
(measured by the variable FCF/Sales), more dispersed control (as reflected by a below 
average Herfindahl index of ownership of voting stock (Herf. control) and the absence of a 
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majority shareholder (the dummy variable Blockholder 50% being equal to zero)), and below 
average intangible assets as a fraction of total assets (measured by the variable Intangible 
assets) are more likely to require more monitoring than other firms. 
The regressions for each sub-sample are identical to those in Table 2. The results are 
reported in Table 4. For brevity, we only report the regression coefficient on our main 
variable of interest, Gap20 chair-CEO. The regressions suggest that the positive effect of the 
chair-CEO age dissimilarity is only observed for those firms that are likely to have more 
monitoring needs. These are the firms with above average free cash flows (regression (2)), 
with a below average Herfindahl index of control (regression (3)), without a majority 
shareholder (regression (5)), and with below average intangibles (regression (7)). The 
coefficient on the variable Gap20 chair-CEO is significant at the 1% level in all of these 
regressions, while it is statistically insignificant – as expected – in the four regressions for the 
sub-samples of firms with relatively low monitoring needs.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
For the same sub-samples, we also repeat the regression analysis from Table 3, which 
focused on the link between the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and the number of board 
meetings. This analysis can be found in Table 5. In line with the previous table, we find that 
Gap20 chair-CEO has a positive and significant effect (at the 10% level or better) on the 
number of board meetings for firms with above average free cash flows (regression (2)), a 
lower control concentration (regressions (3)) and (5)) and below average intangibles 
(regression (7)). It is insignificant for firms with lower monitoring needs. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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To conclude, the results shown in both Table 4 and Table 5 provide strong support for 
our main hypothesis that a considerable age difference between the chair and the CEO 
positively affects firm value as it leads to more intensive monitoring. Importantly, the 
positive relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity on the one side and firm value and 
board meetings on the other side is mainly observed for firms requiring relatively greater 
monitoring.   
6. Identification and Robustness 
This section tests the robustness of our previous results. In Section 6.1, we present an 
identification strategy, using the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to optimal 
monitoring levels, to provide results that allow for causal inference with respect to the main 
hypothesis stating that considerable age differences between the chair and the CEO lead to 
more monitoring of the latter. Section 6.2 raises and addresses several endogeneity concerns. 
Section 6.3 contains additional robustness tests. 
6.1 The financial crisis and the reduced need for monitoring 
In this section, we investigate whether and how the 2007 financial crisis affected the 
link between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and the number of board meetings. We repeat the 
same exercise for the link between the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value. The 2007 
financial crisis constitutes an exogenous shock (see, e.g., Erkens et al., 2012). We expect that 
in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, i.e., in the years 2008 and 2009, there was 
considerably less need for monitoring, more need for fast decision making (De Jonghe and 
Öztekin, 2015, provide evidence in support of this), including an increased need for 
managerial discretion (see Li et al., 2014, for empirical evidence on this), as well as 
potentially more advice seeking from the CEO. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with 
more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the 2007 crisis. In other words, 
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while the work load of both the management and the supervisory board was likely to be 
greater during the crisis (for example, due to strategy changes and an increased need for 
communication with banks and suppliers), the need to monitor the CEO was likely to be 
lower. The reason is that in the recession years 2008 and 2009 the agency problem of 
managerial discretion over free cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) was 
significantly lower. On the one hand, earnings and cash flows declined significantly, leaving 
less cash in the hands of the CEO.15 On the other hand, there was less corporate investment 
during the crisis (see, e.g., Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010).  
We test the above conjecture by including the interaction between Gap20 chair-CEO 
and Financial crisis, a dummy variable, which equals one for the years 2008 and 2009, and 
zero otherwise. We expect this interaction to have a negative impact on the number of board 
meetings. In particular, the negative coefficient should (more or less) cancel out the positive 
effect from chair-CEO age dissimilarity observed during the non-crisis years. Put differently, 
if our main hypothesis is correct and chair-CEO age dissimilarity intensifies monitoring, then 
there will be a significant reduction in board meetings when the need for monitoring declines.  
Yet, while it is possible to reduce the number of board meetings at relatively short 
notice (down to a minimum of four meetings per year as prescribed by German law), it likely 
takes longer to change chair-CEO age dissimilarity. Thus, at the start of the crisis the 
cognitive dissonance between the chair and the CEO is likely to remain for firms where there 
is a considerable age difference pre-crisis. It is unlikely that two persons with a (very) 
different age – reflecting, e.g., different experiences that may conflict with each other and a 
different language – can simply adjust their behavior and way of thinking given the 
                                                          
15
 This assertion is backed up by our data as we find that the percentage of firm-year observations with negative 
net income during the crisis years is 27% compared to only 8% during the non-crisis years. Further, (EBITDA-
based) ROA during the crisis years is lower by -2.4% (i.e., a decline of -22% relative to the sample mean). 
These differences are statistically significant. 
25 
 
exogenous shock caused by the crisis. Consequently, the chair may reduce his or her 
monitoring as much as possible, but cognitive conflicts and communication problems (or the 
greater effort to communicate) will likely remain. This may in turn hamper fast decision 
making and advice giving/seeking as argued in the literature (see, e.g., Westphal 1999; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2014). Given the particular importance of fast 
decision making and advice during crises, we expect the interaction to have a negative impact 
on firm value. 
Given the exogeneity of the 2007 financial crisis, the results of this analysis allow for 
causal inferences. Table 6 reports the regressions on the number of board meetings. The 
results confirm our previous finding of a positive and significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO 
on the number of board meetings. In support of our above argumentation, the interaction 
between Gap20 chair-CEO and Financial crisis is also significant, and has a negative sign. 
The normally positive effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity is now virtually cancelled out, or 
to the very least heavily reduced, during the financial crisis. This is the case not only for the 
full sample (regression (1)), but also for the sub-samples of firms with greater monitoring 
needs as reflected by above average free cash flows (regression (3)), a below average 
Herfindahl index of control (regression (4)), and without a majority shareholder (regression 
(6)). The results are somewhat more nuanced for the sub-samples of firms with below 
average intangibles (regression (8)) and those with above average intangibles (regression (9)). 
For the former, we find that the interaction term is negative but not significant, while it is 
significantly negative for firms with a high fraction of intangible assets, i.e., with particularly 
high needs for advice. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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Table 7, which reports the equivalent regressions on Tobin’s Q, suggests a similar 
effect of the financial crisis on firm value. The table confirms our previous result of a positive 
and significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO on Tobin’s Q. As expected, the interaction 
between Gap20 chair-CEO and Financial crisis is significantly negative. The normally 
positive effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity is heavily reduced during the financial crisis 
for both the full sample (regression (1)) and the sub-samples with greater monitoring needs 
(regressions (3), (4), (6) and (8)). The only exception to the rule is observations with a below 
average Herfindahl index of control (regression (4)) where the coefficient on Gap20 chair-
CEO is positive and significant, but the interaction of the former with Financial crisis is not 
significant. The overall effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, i.e., Gap20 chair-CEO + Gap 
20 chair-CEO*Financial crisis, is still positive as suggested by regression (1) and regressions 
(3), (4), (6) and (8), i.e., for those firms (with high monitoring needs) for which the age gap is 
generally expected to have a positive effect on firm value. We find that the interaction term 
and hence also the overall effect are significantly negative for the sub-sample of firms with a 
high fraction of intangible assets (regression (9)), consistent with regression (9) in Table 6, 
and for those firms which have already a potentially high monitoring level due to their 
concentrated control structure (regressions (5) and (7)). These results further suggest that 
considerable age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO destroys firm value when firms 
have particularly high needs for advice or when their needs for additional monitoring are low. 
This conclusion is consistent with the literature that shows that (too) intensive board 
monitoring can be costly (see, e.g., Faleye et al., 2011). 16 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                          
16
 We note that for the firms with concentrated control age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO is greatest. 
Indeed, the 95th percentile for the variable Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) has a value of 39 for these firms, 
while it is only 32 for the full sample. As the disadvantages of age dissimilarity are more likely to kick in at very 
high levels, this might also explain why the overall effect is negative. 
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Figure 1 visualizes the effects of the financial crisis on Tobin’s Q. The figure shows 
that there was a decrease in the average Tobin’s Q for firms with a generational age gap 
between the chair and CEO during 2008, which was greater than that for firms without such a 
gap. This would suggest that, during a major economic crisis, management-friendlier boards 
create more value than less friendly boards. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To sum up, as conjectured we find evidence that the 2007 financial crisis reduced the 
emphasis on board monitoring. This is reflected by the significant reduction in the positive 
effect of age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO during the crisis for those firms with 
greater monitoring needs and, for firms with lower monitoring needs, the emergence of a 
negative effect of age dissimilarity on firm value during the crisis.  
These results suggest the following three important conclusions. First, firms should 
mind the gap as one size does not clearly fit all. While considerable age dissimilarity between 
the chair and CEO creates value for firms with greater monitoring needs, intensive 
monitoring may destroy firm value when firms need more managerial discretion and advice 
to react to shocks. Second, our full-sample results (see Tables 2 and 3) tend to misrepresent 
the true effects of age dissimilarity on board monitoring and firm value. Finally, the fact that 
the financial crisis  an exogenous shock  had a significant impact on the relationship 
between age dissimilarity on the one side and monitoring and firm value on the other side 
suggests that the relationship is unlikely to be spurious. Nevertheless, we perform additional 
endogeneity tests in the next sub-section to further test the robustness of our results.  
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6.2 Potential endogeneity concerns 
This sub-section addresses two types of endogeneity concerns. The first is unobserved 
CEO and chair heterogeneity. Specifically, certain CEO and/or chair characteristics might be 
significantly correlated with our measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, leading to spurious 
regression results. For example, the Gap20 chair-CEO dummy variable might be correlated 
with the chair’s or the CEO’s prior industry and/or management experience. While our 
analyses in Sections 5 and 6 include some measures of the chair’s and the CEO’s experience, 
such as tenure and whether one of them is the founder of the company, we do not fully adjust 
for experience and other time-invariant heterogeneity.17  
We use CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects to address potential unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogenous matching. We proceed by rerunning the regressions from 
Table 2 (Tobin’s Q) and Table 3 (board meetings). The results are reported in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Both the regressions adjusting for CEO-firm fixed effects (see regressions (1) and (2)) 
and the regressions adjusting for chair-firm fixed effects (see regressions (3) and (4)) confirm 
our previous results. There is a positive and significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO on both 
Tobin’s Q and the number of board meetings. Hence, it seems very unlikely that our results 
can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity or endogenous matching. 
The second endogeneity concern is dynamic endogeneity. To address this issue, we 
use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression technique (e.g., Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). As Wintoki et al. (2012) argue, dynamic endogeneity is a major issue in 
                                                          
17
 In an earlier version of this paper, we used a number of dummy variables indicating whether the CEO and 
chair have a degree in law, economics or sciences, and/or have a doctorate. We also included another set of 
variables, which measured the fraction of supervisory board members with a background in academia, finance, 
auditing, law, and manufacturing. While some of these variables were significant, importantly they did not 
qualitatively affect our key result of a positive effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity on firm value.  
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corporate governance research. It consists of previous realizations of the dependent variable 
affecting current levels of some or all of the independent variables. Wintoki et al. illustrate 
this via the link between firm value and board structure. While past board structure may have 
an impact on current firm performance, current board structure may also be the result of past 
firm performance. Indeed, poor past performance may cause changes to the board of 
directors. Why might dynamic endogeneity be an issue for this study? It may be the case that 
shareholders of underperforming companies call for changes to the board. Such changes 
might be in the form of replacing the incumbent chair with an older individual, which would 
then increase age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO, which in turn would intensify 
board monitoring of the CEO as well as the other executives. 
The results from the GMM regressions are shown in Table 9. We still find that Gap20 
chair-CEO has a positive and significant impact (at the 5% level or better) on both firm value 
and the number of board meetings. Chair-CEO age difference absolute also has a positive 
and significant (at the 5% level) impact on both dependent variables. Hence, our main results 
are unlikely to be driven by omitted variable bias and/or dynamic endogeneity. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6.3 Additional robustness tests 
In the following, we discuss the results of additional robustness tests. For brevity, 
most of these tests are not reported in tabular form. First, despite sufficient time-series 
variation in our data (see the introduction of this paper), we use random effects, as motivated 
and used in Andres (2008), to address the potential concern that parameter identification may 
be limited given that chair-CEO age dissimilarity only changes when the CEO or the chair (or 
both) change. When we rerun all of our regressions using random instead of firm-fixed 
effects, our results are confirmed. Table 10 shows the results of these regressions for our 
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main analyses. The results for the sub-samples are not shown for the sake of brevity. In 
additional unreported regressions, we restrict our sample to observations for which CEO 
change or Chair change or both dummy variables equal one and then consider the effect of 
our main variable, Gap20 chair-CEO, on firm value and the number of board meetings. We 
also consider the effect of this variable when we focus on those observations without CEO 
and chair changes. The regression coefficient on the Gap20 chair-CEO dummy variable 
remains positive and statistically significant in all regressions, independent of whether we 
focus on CEO and chair changes or whether we exclude them.  
Second, we use the return on assets (ROA), a measure of firm performance, as an 
alternative to firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. More specifically, we rerun the regressions 
shown in Table 2 and Table 8 using ROA instead of Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The 
results (shown in Appendix C) strongly support our previous results. We find a consistently 
positive relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm profitability. This relation 
remains significant even when we control for CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects and also 
when we run dynamic panel system GMM estimations. It also remains significant when we 
use random effects (not reported). 
Third, in unreported regressions we examine whether the positive relation between 
age dissimilarity and firm value also holds when we consider age dissimilarities more 
broadly. More specifically, we use the variable Gap20 chair-management board, which 
equals one if there is a generational age gap between the chair and the entire management 
board (based on the average age of its members), and the variable Gap20 supervisory board-
CEO, which equals one if there is a generational gap between the entire supervisory board 
(based on the average age of the shareholder representatives) and the CEO. When we use 
either of these variables instead of Gap20 chair-CEO as well as the same control variables as 
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in Table 2, we find that the corresponding regression coefficients are positive and significant 
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. However, when we add Gap20 chair-CEO to these 
regressions, neither of the two broader measures of age dissimilarity remains significant, 
while the coefficient on Gap20 chair-CEO is significant at the 1% level. Overall, these 
results provide further support for our reasoning that age dissimilarities create value and 
suggest that age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO matters most. 
Fourth, we perform several additional analyses to check the robustness of our 
findings. The corresponding regression results are not shown for the sake of brevity. We 
control for firms which are majority-controlled by other firms. The majority shareholder is 
likely to be represented on the supervisory board and may influence the choice of its chair. 
Using both fixed effects and random effects, the results for our measures of chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity remain qualitatively similar, while the coefficient on the added dummy variable 
for majority-controlled firms is statistically insignificant. Next, when we substitute the 
variable Chair is former firm CEO for the variable Chair is former firm executive, the results 
remain qualitatively similar. This is also the case when we exclude either those chairs who 
were CEOs or, more generally, those chairs who were executives of the firms they now 
oversee. Finally, our results do not change when we winsorize the variable Tobin’s Q at the 
5th and 95th percentile, when we exclude all firms from regulated industries (i.e., firms with 
SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999), or when we exclude firms with less than four firm-
year observations. 
7. Conclusion 
Despite the importance of the chair on corporate boards under both the one-tier and 
the two-tier governance systems, the literature has remained relatively silent about how chair 
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characteristics affect corporate governance effectiveness. Also, little is known about the 
determinants of the important relation between the chair and the CEO. 
This study focuses on the chair-CEO relation and how it affects monitoring and firm 
value. We hypothesize that substantial age dissimilarity leads to cognitive conflict between 
the chair and the CEO, which results in more intensive monitoring of the latter and ultimately 
higher firm value and performance. To test our hypothesis, we examine the relation between 
the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO in the German two-tier board system. Using 
Germany as a laboratory considerably mitigates endogeneity problems as German law 
prohibits CEO duality as well as the CEO’s involvement with the nomination and 
appointment of the members of the supervisory board.  
We provide evidence that greater age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO, 
particularly in the form of a generational age gap, leads to more intensive monitoring and 
higher firm value. Specifically, substantial age dissimilarity creates value in firms expected to 
rely more heavily on monitoring. These are firms with greater free cash flows, less 
concentrated control and fewer intangibles. We find that these firms also hold significantly 
more board meetings. Thus, we find strong support for our hypothesis. 
Our findings are robust to a variety of robustness tests including CEO- and chair-firm 
fixed effects, dynamic panel data estimations, and the use of ROA as an alternative to 
Tobin’s Q. Most importantly, we employ the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to 
the optimal levels of monitoring. We find that firms with substantial chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity significantly reduce the number of board meetings in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis. We further find that during the crisis substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
destroys firm value, consistent with the increased need for managerial discretion and fast 
decision making during the crisis. The negative effect during the crisis almost cancels out the 
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positive effect during the non-crisis years. We hence conclude that firms should mind the 
gap. 
Our results of the effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity on the number of board 
meetings and firm value suggest that in terms of corporate governance regulation one size 
does not fit all. Our findings can be interpreted as evidence that is in contrast with corporate 
governance codes, which recommend age limits for the members of corporate boards. In fact, 
our results suggest that for some firms age limits might be suboptimal as they prevent such 
firms from achieving the optimal age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO.  
Finally, we believe that the insights from this study are not only relevant for the two-
tier board system, but also for the one-tier board system prevailing, for example, in the U.K. 
and the U.S., where a steadily increasing number of firms are abandoning CEO duality. For 
these firms as well as for their shareholders, a sound understanding of the optimal chair-CEO 
relation is likely to be of great relevance.  
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Table 1.  
Summary statistics. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX or 
SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Variable mean 1. quart. median 3. quart. SD min max N 
Panel A - CEO and chair characteristics       
 
Age characteristics         
 
        Gap20 chair-CEO 0.152       697 
Chair-CEO age difference absolute 11.28 5.00 10.00 16.00 7.87 0.00 40.00 697 
Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) 9.68 3.00 10.00 16.00 9.77 -15.00 40.00 697 
Squared chair-CEO age difference 189.02 25.00 100.00 256.00 233.00 0.00 1,600 697 
CEO age (yrs) 53.68 49.00 54.00 59.00 7.11 33.00 71.00 700 
Chair age (yrs) 63.37 59.00 65.00 68.00 7.67 31.00 82.00 697 
Chair younger  0.13       697 
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities         
 
        Chair-CEO different education 0.58       700 
Chair-CEO different gender 0.003       700 
Chair-CEO different nationality 0.17       700 
Chair-CEO joint tenure  3.85 2.00 3.00 5.00 2.87 1.00 16.00 700 
Chair-CEO same family 0.02       700 
CEO characteristics         
 
        CEO change  0.14       700 
CEO tenure 6.36 3.00 5.00 9.00 5.29 1.00 38.00 700 
Founder CEO 0.05       700 
Chair characteristics         
 
        Busy chair 0.76       700 
Chair change 0.15       700 
Chair tenure  5.06 2.00 4.00 7.00 3.90 1.00 28.00 700 
Chair is former firm executive  0.29       700 
Founder chair  0.05       700 
Panel B - Supervisory board characteristics 
         Board age  59.91 57.17 60.67 63.33 4.80 44.30 71.40 700 
Board meetings 5.79 4.00 5.00 17.00 2.40 4.00 34.00 698 
Board size 12.38 6.00 12.00 17.00 5.67 3.00 21.00 700 
Busy board  0.81       700 
CV board age 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.34 700 
Avg. tenure SB members  5.24 4.16 5.33 6.25 1.68 1.00 11.83 700 
No. of active committees   3.07 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.66 0.00 8.00 696 
Union representatives 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.43 0.22 0.00 1.00 700 
Panel C - Firm characteristics 
         Book leverage 0.25 0.11 0.22 0.35 1.90 0.00 0.89 700 
Business segments 2.27 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.03 1.00 6.00 700 
CapEx/TA 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.22 700 
Family firm 0.32       700 
FCF/Sales 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.17 -0.78 1.34 651 
Firm age (foundation) 87.43 35.00 87.00 130.00 56.68 1.00 262.00 700 
Free float (%) 47.82 28.99 47.56 66.36 24.55 0.00 100.00 698 
Herf. control 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.97 699 
Intangible assets 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.00 0.74 700 
R&D/sales 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.26 700 
ROA 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.08 -0.25 0.40 651 
ROE  0.10 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.27 -2.73 3.62 700 
Sales growth 1.19 0.97 1.12 1.26 0.64 -5.38 7.42 700 
Tobin’s Q 1.46 1.01 1.20 1.54 0.84 0.59 8.46 699 
Total assets
 
 49,263.1 936.2 2,575.7 13,565.5 184,648.8 50.9 2,202,423.0 700 
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Panel D – Management board characteristics 
 CV management board age 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.32 618 
Management board age 49.91 46.67 50.18 53.50 4.91 30.00 63.00 698 
Management board size 4.59 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.86 2.00 13.00 700 
Management board tenure 4.48 2.50 4.00 5.75 3.27 0.00 34.00 674 
  
Table 2.  
Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value (Tobin’s Q). This table reports firm-fixed effects panel regression results of 
Tobin’s Q on measures of age dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-chair 
characteristics, CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm characteristics for German 
firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX between the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as sum of the 
firm's market capitalization and the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by 
the book value of total assets. Specifications (1) to (4) and (7) use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, while specifications (5) 
and (6) use the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age difference between the chair and the CEO, calculated as the chair's age minus the 
age of the CEO. Chair-CEO age difference absolute is the absolute value of the age difference between the chair and the CEO. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Tobin’s Q ln(Tobin’s Q) Tobin’s Q 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Gap20 chair-CEO  0.2693*** (3.705) 
0.3251*** 
(4.054)  
0.1496*** 
(4.052)  
0.2649*** 
(3.193) 
Chair-CEO age 
difference (+/-)    
-0.0042 
(-1.400)    
Squared chair-CEO  
age difference    
0.0004*** 
(3.371)    
Chair-CEO age 
difference absolute      
0.0041** 
(2.193)  
Chair younger      -0.0114 (-0.335)  
CEO age 0.0309 (0.157)  
0.4161* 
(1.801)     
Chair age 0.1450 (0.592)  
-0.0605 
(-0.269)     
Other chair-CEO 
dissimilarities 
       
Chair-CEO different 
education 
0.0114 
(0.259) 
-0.0168 
(-0.370) 
-0.0312 
(-0.673) 
0.0107 
(0.246) 
-0.0013 
(-0.056) 
0.0128 
(0.563) 
-0.0200 
(-0.439) 
Chair-CEO different 
gender 
0.0343 
(0.231) 
-0.0097 
(-0.074) 
0.0145 
(0.097) 
-0.0317 
(-0.243) 
0.0062 
(0.094) 
0.0144 
(0.215) 
0.1228 
(0.838) 
Chair-CEO different 
nationality 
0.0212 
(0.207) 
0.0319 
(0.318) 
0.0451 
(0.461) 
0.0225 
(0.217) 
-0.0012 
(-0.031) 
-0.0053 
(-0.130) 
0.0234 
(0.221) 
Chair-CEO joint tenure -0.0015 (-0.120) 
0.0082 
(0.577) 
0.0052 
(0.372) 
0.0008 
(0.064) 
0.0016 
(0.259) 
-0.0022 
(-0.411) 
0.0077 
(0.539) 
Chair-CEO same family 0.0230 (0.158) 
0.2442* 
(1.798) 
0.2355 
(1.620) 
0.0745 
(0.509) 
0.0975 
(1.447) 
0.0205 
(0.294) 
0.1443 
(0.864) 
CEO characteristics        
CEO change -0.0776** (-2.118) 
-0.0922** 
(-2.511) 
-0.0890** 
(-2.421) 
-0.0862** 
(-2.341) 
-0.0509*** 
(-2.826) 
-0.0446** 
(-2.389) 
-0.0945** 
(-2.256) 
CEO tenure -0.0110 (-1.525) 
-0.0121* 
(-1.898) 
-0.0164** 
(-2.189) 
-0.0100 
(-1.485) 
-0.0059* 
(-1.833) 
-0.0029 
(-0.810) 
-0.0140*** 
(-2.730) 
Founder CEO 0.3519* (1.754) 
0.4745*** 
(2.959) 
0.4540*** 
(2.763) 
0.3707** 
(2.077) 
0.3009*** 
(3.009) 
0.2650** 
(2.266) 
0.5304*** 
(3.700) 
Chair characteristics        
Busy chair 0.0126 (0.257) 
0.0167 
(0.341) 
0.0197 
(0.402) 
0.0138 
(0.279) 
0.0103 
(0.464) 
0.0076 
(0.342) 
0.0011 
(0.024) 
Chair change 0.0402 (0.994) 
0.0400 
(1.010) 
0.0416 
(1.036) 
0.0425 
(1.064) 
0.0063 
(0.333) 
0.0073 
(0.381) 
0.0071 
(0.211) 
Chair tenure 0.0003 (0.035) 
-0.0079 
(-0.745) 
-0.0062 
(-0.575) 
-0.0013 
(-0.135) 
-0.0053 
(-1.217) 
-0.0032 
(-0.781) 
-0.0074 
(-0.655) 
Chair is former firm 
executive 
-0.0675 
(-0.945) 
-0.0674 
(-1.058) 
-0.0523 
(-0.800) 
-0.0505 
(-0.713) 
-0.0429 
(-1.353) 
-0.0435 
(-1.298) 
-0.0625 
(-0.936) 
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Founder chair 0.1283 (1.032) 
0.1034 
(1.052) 
0.0785 
(0.745) 
0.1381 
(1.246) 
0.1070** 
(1.969) 
0.1429** 
(2.271) 
0.1018 
(1.056) 
Supervisory board 
characteristics        
Board age 0.0116 (1.483) 
0.0110 
(1.458) 
0.0121 
(1.542) 
0.0117 
(1.507) 
0.0063* 
(1.741) 
0.0060* 
(1.674) 
0.0133* 
(1.707) 
Busy board -0.0336 (-0.510) 
-0.0645 
(-1.011) 
-0.0631 
(-0.946) 
-0.0541 
(-0.847) 
-0.0282 
(-0.883) 
-0.0159 
(-0.493) 
-0.1220* 
(-1.749) 
CV board age -0.5073 (-0.940) 
-0.4260 
(-0.797) 
-0.4271 
(-0.800) 
-0.5633 
(-1.056) 
-0.0170 
(-0.065) 
-0.0882 
(-0.339) 
-0.3066 
(-0.549) 
Firm characteristics        
Book leverage -0.6507** (-2.453) 
-0.6459** 
(-2.446) 
-0.6593** 
(-2.491) 
-0.6654** 
(-2.530) 
-0.3265*** 
(-2.722) 
-0.3196*** 
(-2.687) 
-0.7882*** 
(-2.755) 
Business segments -0.0851*** (-2.931) 
-0.0908*** 
(-3.194) 
-0.0909*** 
(-3.137) 
-0.0845*** 
(-2.962) 
-0.0427*** 
(-3.166) 
-0.0389*** 
(-2.868) 
-0.1030*** 
(-3.475) 
CapEx/TA -0.9548 (-1.625) 
-0.7941 
(-1.372) 
-0.7527 
(-1.274) 
-0.9728* 
(-1.649) 
-0.7951** 
(-2.526) 
-0.9208*** 
(-2.893) 
-0.2398 
(-0.455) 
Family firm -0.3203*** (-2.935) 
-0.2703*** 
(-2.826) 
-0.2532*** 
(-2.679) 
-0.2902*** 
(-2.909) 
-0.1245** 
(-2.386) 
-0.1501*** 
(-2.669) 
-0.2557*** 
(-3.306) 
Firm age (foundation) -0.0800 (-0.634) 
-0.1096 
(-0.836) 
-0.1083 
(-0.803) 
-0.0715 
(-0.535) 
0.0106 
(0.175) 
0.0317 
(0.535) 
-0.1653 
(-0.899) 
Free float -0.0029** (-2.339) 
-0.0029** 
(-2.325) 
-0.0029** 
(-2.287) 
-0.0028** 
(-2.253) 
-0.0011** 
(-1.991) 
-0.0011** 
(-1.973) 
-0.0012 
(-1.080) 
R&D/sales -2.5271 (-0.754) 
-2.5928 
(-0.794) 
-2.9352 
(-0.858) 
-2.2436 
(-0.696) 
-1.0152 
(-0.612) 
-0.7303 
(-0.447) 
-3.4934 
(-1.158) 
ROE 0.0311 (0.482) 
0.0138 
(0.211) 
0.0147 
(0.224) 
0.0188 
(0.290) 
-0.0146 
(-0.456) 
-0.0083 
(-0.259) 
0.0131 
(0.197) 
Sales growth 0.0007 (0.030) 
0.0102 
(0.436) 
0.0124 
(0.511) 
-0.0014 
(-0.059) 
-0.0079 
(-0.909) 
-0.0136 
(-1.526) 
-0.0095 
(-0.588) 
Stock volatility 2.1577 (0.898) 
1.4166 
(0.588) 
1.5823 
(0.662) 
1.8185 
(0.759) 
-0.5760 
(-0.398) 
-0.2433 
(-0.170) 
4.9004** 
(2.207) 
Total assets -0.1611*** (-2.814) 
-0.1539*** 
(-2.877) 
-0.1633*** 
(-2.987) 
-0.1554*** 
(-2.810) 
-0.1099*** 
(-3.748) 
-0.1083*** 
(-3.517) 
-0.1140* 
(-1.937) 
Management board 
characteristics        
CV management board 
age       
1.3902** 
(2.471) 
Management board age       -0.0138* (-1.781) 
Management board size       -0.2090** (-1.994) 
Management board tenure       0.0150 (1.476) 
        Number of observations 694 694 694 694 694 694 599 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Within R-squared 0.286 0.301 0.304 0.293 0.438 0.425 0.374 
        
  
41 
 
Table 3. 
Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring (number of meetings). This table reports firm-fixed effects panel regression 
results of board meetings on measures of age dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-
chair characteristics, CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm characteristics for 
German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings is the number of board 
meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Specifications (1) to (4) use Board meetings as the dependent 
variable, while specifications (5) to (7) use the natural logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-
CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at 
least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age difference between the chair and the CEO, 
calculated as the chair’s age minus the age of the CEO. Chair-CEO age difference absolute is the absolute value of the age 
difference between the chair and the CEO. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) in 
specifications (1) to (4) are based on standard errors clustered by firm. Standard errors in regressions (5) to (7) are based on 
industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year clustering. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Poisson  OLS  
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
         
Gap20 chair-CEO  0.1184** (2.192) 
0.1347** 
(2.146)   
0.1019** 
(2.074)  
0.1477*** 
(3.175) 
Chair-CEO age 
difference (+/-)    
-0.0030 
(-1.012)     
Squared chair-CEO age 
difference    
0.0003** 
(2.192)     
Chair-CEO age 
difference absolute       
0.0055** 
(2.421)  
Chair younger       0.0174 (0.399)  
CEO age -0.1361 (-0.632)  
0.0151 
(0.064)      
Chair age -0.0536 (-0.264)  
-0.1531 
(-0.715)      
Other chair-CEO 
dissimilarities         
Chair-CEO different 
education 
-0.0308 
(-0.873) 
-0.0486 
(-1.377) 
-0.0472 
(-1.337) 
-0.0391 
(-1.096)  
-0.0536* 
(-1.819) 
-0.0490* 
(-1.679) 
-0.0607** 
(-2.145) 
Chair-CEO different 
gender 
-0.2180 
(-1.444) 
-0.1833 
(-1.438) 
-0.2298 
(-1.485) 
-0.2074 
(-1.579)  
-0.1399* 
(-1.718) 
-0.1460* 
(-1.712) 
-0.2697*** 
(-2.991) 
Chair-CEO different 
nationality 
-0.0380 
(-0.605) 
-0.0166 
(-0.292) 
-0.0230 
(-0.376) 
-0.0214 
(-0.382)  
-0.0152 
(-0.330) 
-0.0145 
(-0.309) 
-0.0047 
(-0.106) 
Chair-CEO joint tenure 0.0058 (0.645) 
0.0097 
(1.047) 
0.0098 
(1.067) 
0.0068 
(0.828)  
0.0099 
(1.637) 
0.0075 
(1.290) 
0.0176*** 
(2.696) 
Chair-CEO same family -0.4247*** (-4.022) 
-0.3132*** 
(-2.850) 
-0.3335*** 
(-3.052) 
-0.3691*** 
(-3.552)  
-0.2862** 
(-2.409) 
-0.3060*** 
(-2.626) 
-0.2581** 
(-2.250) 
CEO characteristics         
CEO change 0.0872*** (2.823) 
0.0829*** 
(2.679) 
0.0794** 
(2.554) 
0.0840*** 
(2.759)  
0.0758*** 
(2.734) 
0.0799*** 
(2.871) 
0.0744** 
(2.455) 
CEO tenure 0.0089 (1.583) 
0.0063 
(1.238) 
0.0058 
(0.987) 
0.0077 
(1.445)  
0.0046 
(1.242) 
0.0080* 
(1.959) 
0.0004 
(0.097) 
Founder CEO -0.3641*** (-3.398) 
-0.3023*** 
(-2.807) 
-0.3080*** 
(-2.892) 
-0.3492*** 
(-3.346)  
-0.2936** 
(-2.173) 
-0.3240** 
(-2.387) 
-0.2610* 
(-1.828) 
Chair characteristics         
Busy chair -0.0168 (-0.408) 
-0.0165 
(-0.401) 
-0.0143 
(-0.348) 
-0.0177 
(-0.427)  
-0.0273 
(-0.856) 
-0.0308 
(-0.963) 
-0.0252 
(-0.779) 
Chair change -0.0164 (-0.404) 
-0.0103 
(-0.249) 
-0.0127 
(-0.308) 
-0.0096 
(-0.233)  
0.0222 
(0.847) 
0.0232 
(0.886) 
0.0468* 
(1.732) 
Chair tenure -0.0033 (-0.451) 
-0.0078 
(-1.026) 
-0.0062 
(-0.849) 
-0.0059 
(-0.829)  
-0.0069 
(-1.403) 
-0.0065 
(-1.365) 
-0.0131** 
(-2.508) 
Chair is former firm 
executive 
0.1092 
(1.463) 
0.1049 
(1.434) 
0.1151 
(1.569) 
0.1175 
(1.579)  
0.0938* 
(1.657) 
0.0962* 
(1.687) 
0.1222** 
(2.075) 
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Founder chair 0.1196 (0.727) 
0.1096 
(0.689) 
0.0863 
(0.549) 
0.1346 
(0.840)  
0.1074 
(0.836) 
0.1422 
(1.070) 
0.1837 
(1.306) 
Supervisory board 
characteristics     
 
   
Board age 0.0050 (0.824) 
0.0041 
(0.714) 
0.0049 
(0.816) 
0.0043 
(0.727)  
0.0067 
(1.428) 
0.0060 
(1.281) 
0.0080* 
(1.705) 
Busy board -0.0742 (-1.336) 
-0.0828 
(-1.498) 
-0.0896 
(-1.638) 
-0.0805 
(-1.465)  
-0.0618 
(-1.522) 
-0.0552 
(-1.371) 
-0.0080 
(-0.214) 
CV board age 0.6242 (1.382) 
0.6823 
(1.521) 
0.6883 
(1.528) 
0.5687 
(1.272)  
0.5817* 
(1.928) 
0.4904 
(1.624) 
0.5244* 
(1.875) 
Avg. tenure SB members -0.0447*** (-3.398) 
-0.0393*** 
(-2.819) 
-0.0395*** 
(-2.837) 
-0.0404*** 
(-3.085)  
-0.0368*** 
(-3.409) 
-0.0378*** 
(-3.552) 
-0.0373*** 
(-3.236) 
No. of active committees   0.0439* (1.771) 
0.0423* 
(1.717) 
0.0438* 
(1.742) 
0.0446* 
(1.810)  
0.0342* 
(1.854) 
0.0353* 
(1.937) 
0.0447** 
(2.418) 
Union representatives 0.3021** (2.015) 
0.2733* 
(1.864) 
0.2814* 
(1.927) 
0.2667* 
(1.801)  
0.3091*** 
(2.888) 
0.2965*** 
(2.768) 
0.2617** 
(2.392) 
Firm characteristics         
Book leverage -0.3754* (-1.830) 
-0.3775* 
(-1.817) 
-0.3910* 
(-1.901) 
-0.3846* 
(-1.879)  
-0.3133** 
(-1.985) 
-0.3070* 
(-1.953) 
-0.4424*** 
(-2.709) 
Business segments 0.0671*** (2.762) 
0.0652*** 
(2.733) 
0.0637*** 
(2.623) 
0.0693*** 
(2.886)  
0.0447*** 
(2.841) 
0.0479*** 
(3.047) 
0.0491*** 
(3.004) 
Firm age (foundation) 0.2892 (1.418) 
0.2646 
(1.333) 
0.2671 
(1.364) 
0.2812 
(1.471)  
0.1894* 
(1.776) 
0.2092** 
(1.988) 
0.2702* 
(1.933) 
CapEx/TA -0.6596 (-1.273) 
-0.5821 
(-1.074) 
-0.5279 
(-0.973) 
-0.6677 
(-1.278)  
-0.6448 
(-1.591) 
-0.7585* 
(-1.837) 
-0.6950* 
(-1.698) 
Family firm -0.0292 (-0.276) 
-0.0071 
(-0.060) 
0.0131 
(0.129) 
-0.0204 
(-0.190)  
-0.0381 
(-0.315) 
-0.0536 
(-0.446) 
0.0252 
(0.209) 
Free float 0.0011 (1.100) 
0.0011 
(1.103) 
0.0012 
(1.156) 
0.0012 
(1.169)  
0.0004 
(0.598) 
0.0004 
(0.627) 
0.0006 
(0.914) 
R&D/sales -1.4256 (-1.115) 
-1.6034 
(-1.197) 
-1.5783 
(-1.184) 
-1.3719 
(-1.066)  
-1.4168 
(-1.318) 
-1.0866 
(-1.037) 
-2.4760*** 
(-3.163) 
ROE -0.0215 (-0.489) 
-0.0323 
(-0.681) 
-0.0314 
(-0.665) 
-0.0357 
(-0.746)  
-0.0104 
(-0.236) 
-0.0096 
(-0.219) 
-0.0266 
(-0.634) 
Sales growth -0.0817** (-2.225) 
-0.0709** 
(-2.004) 
-0.0720** 
(-2.011) 
-0.0786** 
(-2.219)  
-0.0533** 
(-2.146) 
-0.0583** 
(-2.271) 
-0.0397 
(-1.450) 
Stock volatility 4.7652* (1.684) 
4.6603* 
(1.688) 
4.7428* 
(1.702) 
4.7165* 
(1.690)  
4.6311** 
(2.134) 
4.7455** 
(2.198) 
4.2346* 
(1.765) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0116 (0.486) 
0.0074 
(0.312) 
0.0051 
(0.222) 
0.0079 
(0.341)  
0.0046 
(0.256) 
0.0077 
(0.436) 
-0.0183 
(-0.551) 
Total assets 0.1187** (2.028) 
0.1162** 
(1.987) 
0.1141* 
(1.959) 
0.1190** 
(2.056)  
0.0967** 
(2.321) 
0.1023** 
(2.484) 
0.1064*** 
(2.613) 
Management board 
characteristics         
CV management board 
age        
-0.4187 
(-1.136) 
Management board age        0.0059 (1.239) 
Management board size        0.0039 (0.054) 
Management board tenure        -0.0056 (-0.921) 
 
    
 
   Number of observations 680 680 680 680  690 690 598 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Within R-squared      0.2233 0.2256 0.2776 
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Table 4. 
Need for Monitoring - Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value (sub-sample analysis). This table shows firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Tobin’s Q on the indicator 
variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control variables as in Table 2 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the 
firm's market capitalization and the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all the regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Independent variables 
FCF/sales 
≤ mean 
FCF/sales 
> mean 
 
Herf. control 
≤ mean 
Herf. control 
> mean 
 
Blockholder 50% 
= 0 
Blockholder 50% 
= 1  
Intangible assets  
≤ mean 
Intangible assets  
> mean 
            
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.0559 (0.768) 
0.6647*** 
(3.686)  
0.1909*** 
(2.501) 
0.1152 
(0.740)  
0.3052*** 
(3.664) 
0.0630 
(0.292)  
0.2946*** 
(3.342) 
0.0344 
(0.393) 
            
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
            Number of observations 398 248  438 256  503 191  458 236 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year 
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Table 5. 
Need for Monitoring - Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board meetings (sub-sample analysis). This table contains Poisson firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results Board meetings on 
the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control variables as in Table 3 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings is the number 
of board meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the 
CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by firm. The constant is included 
in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Board meetings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent variables 
FCF/sales 
≤ mean 
FCF/sales 
> mean 
Herf. ownership   
≤ mean 
Herf. ownership  
> mean 
Blockholder 50% 
= 0 
Blockholder 50% 
= 1 
Intangible assets 
≤ mean 
Intangible assets 
> mean 
         
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.0442 (0.503) 
0.2869*** 
(3.134) 
0.1732** 
(2.514) 
0.1884 
(1.525) 
0.1482** 
(2.104) 
0.0392 
(0.355) 
0.1037* 
(1.753) 
0.0689 
(0.529) 
 
    
  
  Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Number of observations 379 230 428 225 493 170 446 226 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
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Table 6. 
Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board meetings during the financial crisis. This table contains Poisson firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Board meetings on the indicator 
variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control variables as in Table 3 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings is the number of board 
meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at 
least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Financial crisis is an indicator variable set to one if the observation year is either the year 2008 or the year 2009, and zero otherwise. All regression specifications 
include year dummies for each of the non-crisis years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Board meetings 
 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Independent variables 
 Full  
sample 
 FCF/sales 
≤ mean 
FCF/sales 
> mean 
 
Herf. control 
≤ mean 
Herf. control 
> mean 
 
Blockholder 50% 
= 0 
Blockholder 50% 
= 1  
Intangible assets 
≤ mean 
Intangible assets 
> mean 
               
Gap20 chair-CEO  0.1915*** (2.682) 
 0.0581 
(0.600) 
0.3124*** 
(3.077)  
0.3110*** 
(2.813) 
0.1962 
(1.578)  
0.2549** 
(2.556) 
0.0574 
(0.449)  
0.1823** 
(2.157) 
0.1883 
(1.171) 
Gap20 chair-CEO*Financial crisis  -0.1754** (-2.083) 
 -0.0339 
(-0.522) 
-0.1996 
(-1.625)  
-0.2970** 
(-2.303) 
-0.0018 
(-0.033)  
-0.2616** 
(-2.289) 
-0.0078 
(-0.110)  
-0.1766 
(-1.563) 
-0.2206** 
(-2.411) 
Financial crisis 
 -0.0163 
(-0.349) 
 -0.0781 
(-1.599) 
-0.0243 
(-0.386)  
0.0322 
(0.629) 
-0.0897* 
(-1.678)  
0.0114 
(0.0236) 
-0.0993* 
(-1.770)  
0.0068 
(0.119) 
-0.0152 
(-0.267) 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
               Number of observations  680  379 230  428 225  493 170  446 226 
Fixed effects  Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year 
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Table 7. 
Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value during the financial crisis. This table shows firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Tobin’s Q on the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO 
and control variables as in Table 2 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and 
the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference 
between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Financial crisis is an indicator variable set to one if the observation year is either the year 2008 or the 
year 2009, and zero otherwise. All regression specifications include year dummies for each of the non-crisis years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Independent variables 
 Full 
sample  
FCF/sales 
≤ mean 
FCF/sales 
> mean 
 
Herf. control 
≤ mean 
Herf. control 
> mean 
 
Blockholder 50%  
= 0 
Blockholder 50% 
= 1  
Intangible assets 
≤ mean 
Intangible assets 
> mean 
               
Gap20 chair-CEO  0.3906*** (4.684) 
 0.0697 
(0.853) 
0.7121*** 
(3.763)  
0.2255** 
(2.260) 
0.1983 
(1.284)  
0.3715*** 
(3.735) 
0.1815 
(0.890)  
0.4675*** 
(4.556) 
0.0099 
(0.102) 
Gap20 chair-CEO*Financial crisis  -0.3258*** (-3.832) 
 -0.0643 
(-1.016) 
-0.1772 
(-1.464)  
-0.1251 
(-1.197) 
-0.3676*** 
(-2.837)  
-0.2258** 
(-2.359) 
-0.3083** 
(-2.151)  
-0.4418*** 
(-3.974) 
-0.1326** 
(-2.028) 
Financial crisis  -0.2069*** (-3.278) 
 -0.1113*** 
(-3.060) 
-0.2864*** 
(-2.932)  
-0.1934*** 
(-3.962) 
-0.1158 
(-1.484)  
-0.2335*** 
(-4.847) 
-0.2163 
(-1.626)  
-0.1791** 
(-3.153) 
-0.1214 
(-1.597) 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
               Number of observations  694  398 248  438 256  503 191  458 236 
Fixed effects  Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year 
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Table 8. 
Unobserved CEO or chair heterogeneity  CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects. This table shows panel regression results for the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control 
variables for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010 using CEO-firm-fixed effects (specification (1) and (2)) or chair-firm-fixed effects 
(specification (3) and (4)). Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, 
divided by the book value of total assets. Board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. The dependent variable in regressions (1) 
and (3) is Tobin’s Q, specification (2) and (4) use the natural logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age 
difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. If not stated otherwise, control variables in specification (1) and (3) follow 
Table 2, controls in specification (2) and (4) are identical to Table 3. Differences in the set of control variables result from omitting time invariant variables for the CEO (i.e., Founder 
CEO) or the chair of the supervisory board (i.e., Founder chair, Chair is former firm executive), respectively. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Tobin’s Q Board meetings  Tobin’s Q Board meetings 
Independent variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.3101*** (3.152) 
0.2992*** 
(3.169)  
0.2324** 
(2.265) 
0.1100* 
(1.890) 
      
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics CEO change, CEO tenure CEO change, CEO tenure  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes  Busy chair,  Chair change, Chair tenure 
Busy chair,  
Chair change, Chair tenure 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Number of observations 694 690  694 690 
Fixed effects CEO-firm, year CEO-firm, year  Chair-firm, year Chair-firm, year 
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Table 9. 
Dynamic panel data models (system GMM estimations). This table contains results of the dynamic, system Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) regressions of Tobin’s Q, ln(Tobin’s Q), and Board meetings on measures of age dissimilarity between the 
CEO and the chair of the supervisory board for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX and SDAX in 2005 and 2010. Tobin's 
Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and the difference between the book value of total assets and the 
book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the 
supervisory board during the fiscal year. Board meetings used in regression (4) and (5) is the natural logarithm of the number of 
firm’s board meetings in a given year. Control variables for the specifications (1) to (3) are identical to Table 2, while control 
variables for specification (4) and (5) follow those used in Table 3. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The system GMM includes two sets of regressions: (i) regressions in levels with the lagged 
differences (t-2) of the dependent and independent variables as instruments and (ii) regressions in first differences with the 
lagged levels (t-3) of the dependent and independent variables as instruments. We use the year dummies as strictly exogenous 
variables. The GMM style variables are the respective dependent variable as well as Gap20 chair-CEO, CEO-chair different 
education, CEO-chair different gender, CEO-chair different nationality, Board age, Free float, Book leverage, CapEx/TA, 
R&D/sales, ROE, Sales growth, Stock volatility, and Total assets. We use the small sample option (similar to Wintoki et al., 
2012). Running the dynamic panel estimations without this option, all results remain significant. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively, in the first differenced residuals under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is based on the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity is based on the null that the instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. The constant is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Tobin’s Q  ln(Tobin’s Q) ln(Tobin’s Q)  Board meetings Board meetings 
Independent variables (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
        
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.6007** (2.397)  
0.2783*** 
(2.661)   
0.4227*** 
(2.912)  
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute    
0.0077** 
(2.127)   
0.0157** 
(2.381) 
Chair younger    -0.0252 (-0.335)   
0.0298 
(0.299) 
Board meetings
 t-1      
0.3082*** 
(2.856) 
0.3154*** 
(3.242) 
ln(Tobin’s Q
 t-1)   0.5315*** (5.171) 
0.5774*** 
(6.154)    
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.3532** (2.112)     
-0.0033 
(-0.053) 
0.0301 
(0.558) 
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities        
Chair-CEO different education 0.0494 (0.370)  
-0.0187 
(-0.334) 
-0.0039 
(-0.078)  
-0.1234* 
(-1.726) 
-0.1163* 
(-1.660) 
Chair-CEO different gender -0.5043 (-0.411)  
-0.4065 
(-0.640) 
-0.0486 
(-0.115)  
-0.3180 
(-0.543) 
-0.0947 
(-0.184) 
Chair-CEO different nationality -0.0669 (-0.406)  
-0.0216 
(-0.268) 
-0.0526 
(-0.649)  
0.0991 
(1.020) 
0.0813 
(0.971) 
Chair-CEO joint tenure 0.1123** (2.278)  
0.0432** 
(2.119) 
0.0342* 
(1.775)  
0.0166 
(0.633) 
0.0040 
(0.190) 
Chair-CEO same family -1.1853* (-1.703)  
-0.5086* 
(-1.776) 
-0.3479 
(-1.531)  
-0.5567* 
(-1.685) 
-0.3721 
(-1.102) 
CEO characteristics        
CEO change 0.0491 (0.367)  
-0.0057 
(-0.084) 
-0.0056 
(-0.101)  
-0.0799 
(-0.731) 
-0.0172 
(-0.199) 
CEO tenure -0.0359 (-1.633)  
-0.0159 
(-1.590) 
-0.0112 
(-1.420)  
-0.0227* 
(-1.893) 
-0.0103 
(-0.995) 
Founder CEO 2.3047* (1.849)  
0.7378* 
(1.820) 
0.4975 
(1.423)  
0.7632* 
(1.692) 
0.3479 
(0.890) 
Chair characteristics        
Busy chair -0.1053 (-0.480)  
-0.0140 
(-0.155) 
-0.0426 
(-0.545)  
0.0478 
(0.419) 
0.0247 
(0.229) 
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Chair change 0.0066 (0.048)  
0.1028 
(1.632) 
0.0809* 
(1.666)  
-0.0144 
(-0.148) 
-0.0491 
(-0.544) 
Chair tenure -0.0457 (-1.493)  
-0.0128 
(-1.010) 
-0.0069 
(-0.689)  
-0.0087 
(-0.434) 
-0.0113 
(-0.704) 
Chair is former firm executive -0.2944 (-1.133)  
-0.1500 
(-1.400) 
-0.2072** 
(-2.008)  
-0.1035 
(-0.897) 
-0.1768 
(-1.451) 
Founder chair 0.9425 (1.509)  
0.2897 
(1.087) 
0.2885 
(1.272)  
0.1636 
(0.634) 
0.0850 
(0.348) 
Supervisory board characteristics        
Board age 0.0030 (0.127)  
0.0066 
(0.699) 
0.0034 
(0.436)  
-0.0065 
(-0.459) 
0.0014 
(0.121) 
Busy board 0.0031 (0.014)  
-0.0211 
(-0.232) 
0.0155 
(0.234)  
-0.1895 
(-1.417) 
-0.1616 
(-1.543) 
CV board age 0.0335 (0.021)  
0.0841 
(0.106) 
0.1455 
(0.234)  
-0.4224 
(-0.443) 
0.6048 
(0.669) 
Avg. tenure SB members      0.0074 (0.243) 
0.0094 
(0.386) 
No. of active committees        -0.0239 (-0.783) 
-0.0072 
(-0.277) 
Union representatives      -0.0249 (-0.072) 
0.0434 
(0.150) 
Firm characteristics        
Book leverage -0.2948 (-0.785)  
-0.2050 
(-1.103) 
-0.2111 
(-1.491)  
0.2073 
(0.965) 
0.3131 
(1.445) 
Business segments -0.1727** (-2.001)  
-0.0438 
(-0.989) 
-0.0155 
(-0.421)  
-0.0164 
(-0.334) 
0.0292 
(0.686) 
CapEx/TA 2.2758 (1.316)  
0.9613 
(1.327) 
0.8183 
(1.088)  
0.1563 
(0.145) 
0.1158 
(0.128) 
Family firm 0.3601* (1.805)  
0.1838* 
(1.666) 
0.0889 
(0.982)  
0.0083 
(0.052) 
-0.0336 
(-0.277) 
Free float -0.0017 (-0.472)  
0.0009 
(0.652) 
0.0005 
(0.440)  
0.0002 
(0.110) 
0.0001 
(0.070) 
Firm age (foundation) 0.1098 (0.905)  
0.0440 
(0.817) 
0.0223 
(0.504)  
0.0650 
(1.073) 
-0.0178 
(-0.328) 
R&D/sales 3.7106 (1.388)  
1.1760 
(0.921) 
1.0331 
(0.926)  
-0.3028 
(-0.189) 
-0.6896 
(-0.463) 
ROE -0.2226* (-1.873)  
-0.1621*** 
(-2.798) 
-0.1163** 
(-2.195)  
-0.0773 
(-1.006) 
-0.0578 
(-0.722) 
Sales growth -0.1059 (-1.231)  
-0.0367 
(-1.186) 
-0.0478 
(-1.615)  
-0.0047 
(-0.096) 
-0.0299 
(-0.643) 
Stock volatility 6.7823 (1.242)  
1.1845 
(0.437) 
0.1588 
(0.067)  
5.4007 
(1.586) 
4.0891 
(1.236) 
Total assets 0.0386 (1.183)  
0.0129 
(0.915) 
0.0038 
(0.267)  
0.0556 
(1.581) 
0.0185 
(0.700) 
Year controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
  Number of observations 539  539 539  536 536 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  
(p-value) 0.019  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
(p-value) 0.644  0.460 0.459  0.528 0.525 
Hansen test for overidentification 
restrictions (p-value) 0.467  0.593 0.523  0.568 0.416 
Diff-in-Hansen test GMM (p-value) 0.249  0.400 0.346  0.611 0.403 
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Table 10.  
Random effects regressions. This table reports random effects panel regression results of Tobin’s Q and Board meetings on 
measures of age dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-chair characteristics, CEO 
characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm characteristics for German firms listed on the 
DAX, MDAX, or SDAX between the sample period 2005 to 2010. Specifications (1) and (2) use Tobin's Q as the dependent 
variable. Specification (3) uses the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Specifications (4) and (5) use Board meetings as the 
dependent variable. Specification (6) uses the natural logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 
years, and zero otherwise. Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age difference between the chair and the CEO, calculated as the 
chair's age minus the age of the CEO. Chair-CEO age difference absolute is the absolute value of the age difference between the 
chair and the CEO. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported. 
Specifications (2) and (5) include year dummies for each of the non-crisis years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. Industry-fixed 
effects are based on the Fama and French 12 industries. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.    
 Tobin’s Q  Board meetings 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.2348*** (3.124) 
0.3487*** 
(4.049)  
 0.1286** 
(1.972) 
0.1870** 
(2.090)  
Gap20 chair-CEO*Financial crisis  -0.3143*** (-3.742)  
 
 
-0.1479* 
(-1.680)  
Financial crisis  -0.1618*** (-3.320)  
 
 
-0.0519 
(-1.053)  
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute   
0.0051*** 
(3.031) 
 
 
 0.0045** 
(2.152) 
Chair younger   -0.0015 (-0.042) 
 
 
 
-0.0073 
(-0.191) 
        Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        Number of observations 694 694 694  690 690 690 
Fixed effects Industry, year 
Industry, 
year 
Industry,  
year 
 Industry, 
year 
Industry, 
year 
Industry, 
year 
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Figure 1.  
Gap20 chair-CEO and firm value (Tobin’s Q) over time. This figure shows a plot of annual average values of Tobin’s Q 
for firms with and without an age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO of at least 20 years. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Definition of variables. 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
Board meetings The number of ordinary and extraordinary board meetings as well as the number of 
video and telephone conferences held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. 
Meetings are reported in the firms’ annual reports. 
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
Tobin’s Q The firm’s market value to its replacement costs approximated by the market 
capitalization plus the difference between the book value of total assets and the book 
value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. 
Age characteristics  
CEO age The natural logarithm of the age of the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO). 
Chair-CEO age 
difference (+/-) 
The age difference (in years) between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
calculated as chair age minus CEO age.  
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute 
The absolute value of the age difference (in years) between the chair of the supervisory 
board and the CEO.   
Chair age The natural logarithm of the age of the supervisory board’s chair.  
Gap20 chair-CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the age difference between the chair of the 
supervisory board and the CEO and is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. This 
dummy variable measures a generational gap, as reflected by an age difference of at 
least 20 years as suggested by Strauss and Howe (1997). 
Squared chair-CEO age difference The squared age difference between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board.  
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities 
Chair-CEO different education Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO do 
not have the same education (law, economics, else), and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO different gender Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
have a different gender, and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO different nationality  Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
have different nationalities, and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO joint tenure The number of years the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO have been working 
together in these positions. 
Chair-CEO same family Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO are 
from the same family. 
CEO characteristics  
CEO change Dummy variable set to one for years when there is a CEO change. 
 
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been serving as the CEO of the firm. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable set to one if the CEO is the founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
Chair characteristics  
Busy chair Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the chair of the supervisory board holds 
three or more directorships, and zero otherwise. 
Chair change Dummy variable set to one if either the firm’s chair of the supervisory board takes 
office in a given year. 
Chair tenure The number of years the chair has been serving as the chair of the supervisory board. 
Chair is former firm CEO Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chair of the supervisory board is the 
firm’s former CEO, zero otherwise. 
Chair is former firm executive Dummy variable that takes the value of one if chair of the supervisory board is a former 
member of the firm’s management board, and zero otherwise. 
Founder chair Dummy variable set to one if the chair of the supervisory board is the founder of the 
company, and zero otherwise. 
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Supervisory board characteristics 
Board age The average age of all the shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. 
Board size The total number of members on the supervisory board. 
Busy board Dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least 50% of the shareholder 
representatives hold three or more directorships, and zero otherwise. 
CV board age The coefficient of variation of the supervisory board age defined as the standard 
deviation of the age of shareholder representatives on the supervisory board divided by 
the average age of shareholder representatives. 
Avg. tenure SB members 
 
The average tenure (in years) of all supervisory board members. Board appointment is 
traced back to the year 1998. 
No. of active committees  The number of committees involving members of the supervisory board and that meet 
at least once a year. 
Union representatives The number of union representatives on the supervisory board divided by the number of 
employee representatives. 
Management board 
characteristics 
 
CV management board age The coefficient of variation of the management board age defined as the standard 
deviation of the age of the members of the management board, excluding the CEO, 
divided by the average age of the members of the management board, excluding the 
CEO. 
Management board age The average age of the members of the management board, excluding the CEO. 
Management board size The natural logarithm of the total number of members of the management board. 
Management board tenure The average number of years the members of the management board have been serving 
on the firm’s management board, excluding the CEO.  
Firm characteristics  
Book leverage The firm’s book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, both 
measured at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Blockholder 50% Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a single shareholder holds at least 50% of 
the common shares outstanding, and zero otherwise. 
Business segments The number of business segments reported in S&P Capital IQ that generate at least 10% 
of the firm’s annual total revenues. 
CapEx/TA The firm’s capital expenditures (CapEx) standardized by total assets, both measured at 
the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Family firm Dummy variable that is set to one if the firm is a family firm according to the definition 
used in Anderson and Reeb (2003), and zero otherwise. 
FCF/Sales Free cash flow (defined as EBITDA - CapEx) divided by total sales. 
Firm age (foundation) The natural logarithm of the number of years since the foundation of the firm. 
Free float The percentage of the company’s voting shares to be free float. 
Herf. control The Herfindahl index of all blockholders that own at least 5% of the firm’s ordinary 
shares. 
Intangibles assets The firm’s book value of intangible assets divided by the book value of total assets. 
R&D/sales The annual R&D expenditures divided by total revenue, both measured at the end of the 
fiscal year t-1. Missing R&D values are set to zero. 
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
ROE The firm’s net income divided by the book value of equity, both measured at the end of 
the fiscal year t-1. 
Sales growth The nominal growth rate of total revenues over the past two years. 
Stock volatility Stock volatility is measured as the stock volatility (standard deviation) over the past two 
years using daily stock returns.  
Total assets The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
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Appendix B. Histogram for Chair-CEO age difference (+/-). 
This figure shows a histogram of the age difference between the the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO for the sample of German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX or SDAX in the sample period 
2005 to 2010. 
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Appendix C. Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm profitability (return on assets). 
This table reports panel regression results of return on assets (ROA) on measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity and additional controls for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in 2005 
and 2010. ROA is defined as EBITDA to book value of total assets. Regressions (1) to (4) use firm-fixed effects, regression (5) uses CEO-firm fixed effects, regression (6) uses chair-firm fixed effects, 
and regressions (7) and (8) are dynamic panel system GMM estimations (similar to those in Table 9). ROEt-1 is excluded from the set of control variables named Firm characteristics. All other sets of 
controls are as in Table 2. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Regressions (1) to (6) use robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and 
year, regressions (7) and (8) use robust standard errors clustered by firm. A constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 ROA ROA ROA  ln(ROA)  ROA  ROA  ROA  ln(ROA) 
 Firm-fixed effects  CEO-firm FE  Chair-firm FE  System GMM 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
              
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.0439*** (4.466) 
0.0354*** 
(3.036)     
0.0342* 
(1.649)  
0.0226** 
(2.059) 
 0.0787* 
(1.781) 
  
Chair-CEO age difference (+/-)   0.0005 (0.946)       
    
Squared chair-CEO 
age difference   
0.0001*** 
(2.594)       
    
Chair-CEO age difference absolute     0.0013*** (2.794)     
   0.0025** 
(1.987) 
Chair younger     -0.0038 (-0.429)     
   0.0130 
(0.455) 
CEO age  -0.0292 (-0.862)        
    
Chair age  0.0582* (1.774)        
    
              Other chair-CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 CEO tenure, 
CEO change 
 Busy chair, 
Chair change, 
Chair tenure 
 
Yes  Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              Number of observations 646 646 646  646  646  646  502  502 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year  CEO-firm, year  Chair-firm, year  Firm, year  Firm, year 
R-squared (within) 0.208 0.212 0.211  0.184  0.248  0.248     
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)           0.001  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)           0.593  0.363 
Hansen test for overidentification restrictions (p-value)           0.452  0.207 
Diff-in-Hansen test GMM (p-value)           0.371  0.207 
              
